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MODERN THOUGHT AND THE TRANSCENDENT 
Some observations based on an Eastern view 
J. G. Arapura 
In modern philosophy notions of the transcendent are under attack. Some 
philosophers have put them aside, others have positively ignored them and yet 
others have openly rejected them. Of course there are also some great thinkers 
like Martin Heidegger who have given us new interpretations of the transcendent 
from their own very profound standpoints. However, even at the beginning we 
cannot avoid ironies. For is it possible, in a strange way, that the one who 
originally denied the transcendent to reason (Kant) still preserved the Eternal, 
while another who held the transcendent up to thought (Heidegger) let go of the 
Eternal? 
But on the whole in modern thought in general, not just in philosophy, but in 
the wider field led or even followed by philosophy, the transcendent has been 
allowed to suffer attrition. There is in the first place the most dominant trend in 
all modern thought, namely, positivism, involving a radical turning away from 
the Eternal and the transcendent. In the face of it new expressions of 
profundities involving the question of being and hence the transcendent would 
appear to be a mere change of pace in a world too impatient to be held up 
unduly by matters that are not taken seriously any more. But then those who 
have the patience and requisite turn of mind to join in thinking about such 
matters do not feel justified in ignoring them. 
Modern thought undoubtedly is Western not only in its origin but in its 
direction as well. Nevertheless no part of the world is any longer outside its 
embrace. Even the most sophisticated of Eastern cultures are waking up to the 
fact that something powerful has hit them. They notice, of course, the most 
obvious expressions of it, in Marxist revolution and technology particularly, 
which are both Western in origin, but they often do not see much of what lies 
behind these conspicuous expressions. 
But some indeed do see it. And many of those who see do not react at all 
while those who react do so diversely. First of all there are the out and out 
Eastern protagonists of modernity in the East who never ask any deep 
questions but speak and act as though acceptance of modernity is a matter of 
simple technical and of external adjustment. Then there are two types of more 
serious people, who are rather given to apologetic interpretation and applied 
thought than to anything else. Here interpretation may take place in either 
direction. In other words, some people put modern Western thought in some 
traditional Eastern package, while others try to package traditional Eastern 
thought in the language and the categories of the modern West. As for the latter 
group, again, what is selected by each person as typical Eastern or Western 
thought will depend upon his own interest and bias. By and large, it is said that 
Chinese scholars are given to presenting Western thought in Chinese dress (to 
their own people, of course). while traditionally Indian scholars are apt to 
engage in expressing Indian thought in Western language and idiom. Both of 
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these types of activity require selecting parallels from the East and the West. 
And parallels, however superficial, are available in large quantities. 
Leaving aside all these, let us tum to another kind of possible Eastern 
reaction, a genuine philosophical response. Now, this is a very difficult thing, 
to begin with. Jn talking about a philosophical response, are we not supposed to 
have an agreed upon understanding as to what philosophy is? And certainly 
one should not try to take advantage of the fact tbat there is no definition of 
philosophy on which all have agreed. Historically philosophy is a Western 
phenomenon. There are even questions as to whether there is philosophy 
outside the West. Even such a great figure as Heidegger writes that philosophy 
is only Western "and lhere is no other neither a Chinese nor an Indian 
Philosophy" .1 However even if this contention were true in a narrow sense, by 
excluding certain highly specialized and sustained Eastern intellectual 
enterprises to know, one is missing a supreme chance to arrive at some 
profound understanding and possibly a definition of what philosophy is. 
Really when we try to define philosophy a strange thing seems to happen, 
namely that we find that we have to come to grips with the task in terms of 
omething elusive which controversially occupies U1e very centre of the 
philosophical enterprise. The concrete instance here is the transcendent. That 
is to say, is coming to know or at least to deal with the transcendent essential to 
philosophy? The fundamental controversy in modem philosophy is really about 
U1i question, although it may appear in several different garbs. No definition of 
philosophy is possible without including a resolution of this problem, and in 
fact none exists. Accordingly today the very definition of philo ophy must take 
into account the issue of the expulsion of the transcendent from modern 
thought. And even if we are only trying to consider this issue without explicitly 
linking it to attempts to define philosophy we are implicitly doing so; and 
contrariwise, even when we are only making an effort to define philosophy our 
effort is likewise implicitly tied to the issue of the transcendent. Surely there 
could be other such controversial issues which are linked with the projects of 
defining philosophy, but today this is the most central one. 
In both respects, that is to say, that of defining philosophy in terms of 
something most controversial and that of having a most controversial issue, the 
Vedanta is well qualified to be welcomed to the stage. Its ab olute certainty 
about Ultimate Reality (Brahman) has the power to ignite in new ways the 
philosophical problem of the transcendent. 
Now, in view of Immanuel Kant's special u e of the term 'transcendent' and 
the consequent association of that special meaning to the word in later 
philosophy, it is necessary to make some preliminary remarks about it. For the 
transcendent is to Kant a false dimension as it were U1at reason in its pre-
critical arrogance assumes, whereby it fancies that it knows what is beyond its 
power to know, namely tl1e Ultimate Real or the things-in-themselves. Hence 
he condemns it as a false principle. 2 Becau e Kant is dealing with the 
transcendent in the context of the method of knowing, or epistemology as it is 
called, he is naturally talking about knowledge in the sense of knowing tbe real 
that is out there from here. In fairness to Kant it must be said that he left the 
real in its complete aura of sacredness, so to speak, without allowing it to be 
touched with anything from here. The transcendent, accordingly, is understood 
as the principle of pre-critical reason's moving from here to a beyond that is out 
there. The distance between here and there, he felt is immeasurable. Into that 
gap faith is introduced as a matter of practical reason. "I have therefore found 
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it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith' , he writes.l 
The Vedanta takes a very different approach. lt i not talking about a beyond 
measured from here to an unbounded ' there' . It is reversing !!_1e base of the 
projection, from a definite there to an indeterminate (anirvacaniya) here. It is 
as impressed as Kant was about the sheer unknowability or the Real. In lhis 
context it puts forward the remarkable thesis that the Ultimately Real is 
unknowable for the utterly paradoxical reason that it i knowledge (gnosis) 
itself. Sankara defines the Vedanta as philosophy in a breath-takingly simple 
and direct fashion thus: ' it is the vis.ion f the principle of Ultima!e Reality 
wherein is no distinction of knowledge known and knower' unana-ji(eya-jfiatr-
), Commentary on lhe Mandukya 
Kiirika, 4.1. The word ,j,fana and dafiana are worth pausing over a lillie: 
jiliina translated gno is and philologically cognate with it primarily describes 
the disposition of the Ultimately Real within itself, and secondarily it means 
our knowledge of the Ultimately Rea l by virtue of lhat ame disposition. 
Darsana, literally vi ion , view, perccpti n ha the primary meaning of theorea 
and the secondary meaning of theory (which is itself metamorphosed from 
rheorea). ln the latter sense it is being used as a word by which to translate 
' philosophy . The compound word ratrva-darfana, lhat is, darsana oftattva or 
principle can al o be used in a primary or a secondary ens . However, we 
must not lose sight of the fact thatjli'ana and darsana are not identical except 
where the secondary meaning of the former and the primary meaning of the 
latter arc concerned which are lhe same. Also a a precaution against 
confusion it is good to be aware that in popular parlance words, even the 
highest, are seldom preserved for their pristine usages but are often tretched 
out into econdary or tertiary employment. Such an exten ion of usage is 
clearly evident in U1e case f the word jftiina. It is u ed for any knowledge, 
particularly for cognition. It is al,so u ed in lieu of dar..,ana or philo ophy. But 
in the compound form , taffva,_-jnana it has been invariably used in the same 
sense, exactly like tattva-darsana. 
But let us return to the essential meaning of j/{ana as gnosis, defined above 
a · the Ultimately Real' dispo ition in itself. Clearly, we have to grant that the 
word 'disposition' i a metaphor. and there just is no way of geuing beyond 
metaphor · when we are speaking about the Ultimately Real. When we say 
" there ju t is no way of getting beyond metaphor ' we mu t not take this a the 
doom of thought or its eternal confinement to a terrestria l orbit. On the 
contrary metaphor can mean ur release towards that about wh.ich we speak, 
namely the Ultimately Real. The only precaution i that we must not make the 
usc of metaphors a elf- erving habit. an end in itself, a substitute for the real 
thing. a cause of illu ion a mere play. 
When we speak of the disposition f the Ultimately Real in it elf. and in o 
far as we do so metaphorically. we understand this di po ition to be as it is 
tOI''ards us. Thi kind of di positi n or di positional activity is what is 
expressed by the Upani adic-Vedantic usage of thew rd iccha and its variants 
such as etc. ll tand, for the very ground f the acti ities 
which we know diversely as thinking. willing. desiring. lt is al o the activity by 
which things come to be. We find reference to it in the Upanisad , most 
notably in Cltandogya 6.2.3: Aitareya 1.1.1: Prasna 6.3. In that way gnosi i 
an activity. not in the ordinary sen e of m ving toward a goal or executing a 
purpose or anything of that ·ort. but rather in a metaphorical sen e. But the 
metaph r must n 1 be taken to mean a mere ligure of pee h whereby the 
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known not to pos e them a when we ay 'the sea is angry'. Texts of Vedanta 
take special care to say that the activity of gnosi is not uch a figure of speech 
technically called gauua in the Indian theories of meaning. Referring to such 
activity. Vedama Siiu·a 1. 1.6 gati)Jascerna atmasag_dat (Is it a mere figure of 
peech? No. because of the word At man.) settles it. Sankara commenting on it 
demon trates the deep connection of such activity with Being (satl itself and 
writes also ''because the word Atman is employed in reference to it is 
not used a a figure of speech (here)' . Therefore, it is a metaphor in the deepe t 
sense of the word. Heidegger' comment on Kant on a certain point is quite 
pertinent and illuminating in this context. " U what Kant terms ·our thought i 
this pure se lf-orienting reference to ... the ' thinking' of such a thought is not an 
act of judgement but i thinking in the ense of the free, but n t arbitrary 
'envisi ning' (Sich-denken) of something, an envisi ning which is at once a 
forming and a projecting. This primordial act f ' thinking is an act of pure 
imagination". 4 Agreed. but question. 'who i the thinker in this thinking?' Or 
i it a mere subjectless activity? There is a thin line between metaphor and 
figure of speech, and yet it i also the widest gulf and therefore the most 
peril u . The Vedanta always insist that it is important t look at the other 
ide of a metaphor to ee what it is a metaph r of, as othef\vi c it could easily 
become a mere fi gure of peech emphasizing n thing but thought ' " elf-
orienting reference to". Heidegger ha h wn us the great depth of what is 
called thought, and has analyzed in a masterly way that thinking is not grasping 
or prehending but receptivity t what lies before In the light of the 
Vedanta. one has to a k "Ha not what lie re us the character of gno i , 
in which the very conjunction of legeilt and noein a the fundamental character 
of thinking that Heidegger speaks about 6 is made po ·sible, and does not 
recepti ity it elf insofar as by definition it i not activity, presuppose as a 
c mplementary an activity elsewhere, which i none other than gno is? ' 
A far a the Vedanta is concerned. the metaphor of gn is being it own 
activity i important for another reason. that i t ay in order t negate the 
impre ion thnt the kn wledge f the Etemal that man gain i the result of any 
activity n hi part. Saiikara write : "The cience f the kn ' ledge f Brahman 
d e not depend up n any activity on the pan f man, (in other word it i not 
Commentary on the Vedanta fitras, 1. 1.4. Gnosis 
is never pr duced: it i what there. in eparable from the Eternal or 
Ultimate!. Real. 
The Vedanta. beginning from the uses the analogy of light to 
de ·cribc gno is. Brahman is the light of lights, 
Upani.ad, 4.4. 16, 3.9.10). - very thing i at sometime or 
other poken f as light. Gn i is described as the transcendent elf-shining 
light f Brahman. There nc cr was any need to e tabli h the cxi tence of the 
tran ccndcnt self- hining ligh1. On the c ntrary. it elf-evidence wa 
demonstrated n the gr und that all other c idcnce. depend n it. This is the 
unique proce lure f rea oning that the Vedanta in it ch last ic development 
carried out t perfecti n. Ont logically there never was any anempt to pr ve 
the transcendent. On the c ntrary. the way ch en wa t let it demon trate 
itself as the sole gr und (iidhara ) of all things. H wever. we mu. t forbid 
ourselves to enter the vast and intricate area of the debate between t11e Vedanta 
and pposing cho I like the yaya on what came to be advanced as the 
I ctrine f self-luminosity ( raprakii"'a) as the e oppo ing schools rejected it 
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and proposed their own doctrine of other-luminosity 
Surely modem thought is a far cry from self-luminosity. For this reason 
when Vedanta joins in a philosophical response to modern thought, particularly 
in the context of lhe modern expulsion of the transcendent from the ground of 
knowledge, it i bound to take its stand on its unique views of gnosis and self-
light. It is bound to be at odds with the basis of contemporary epistemology, 
wilh its views of positivist rationality. The latter assumes that our primary task 
in the pursuit of kn wleclge is executed by what is most tellingly called 
research, that is to say, our own bringing a little light into an inherently dark 
situation. There is no longer any notion of a general light which shines apart 
from our efforts in which things can be dis-covered. 
The turn away from the transcendent accords with the rejection of the 
notions of any general light which exists out there, apart from our own efforts 
to produce a little illumination by our own research. As for the grounds for the 
turn away from both these above it is a matter on which great scholars have 
written extensively and deeply. But one circumstantial connection seems 
extremely interesting especially as viewed from the perspective of comparison 
with the Vedanta with its emphasis on the transcendent as gnosis and self-light. 
To point it out seems even more pressing because modem writers on the 
Vedanta who have striven to interpret it, including especially its typical views 
of the transcendent, to the West have simply failed to notice it. I am speaking 
of the Appearance- Reality metaphysics grounded in Kant's Critiques. 
A hundred years f comparative scholarship on the Vedanta has assumed, 
based of course on striking similarity of language and even method between 
some works of the Vedanta and Kant that it is an Appearance-Reality 
metaphysics. But the difference is very significant. 
In the Vedanta only Brahman, the Ultimately Real, shines by itself, nothing 
else shines by itself but all things shine in the light of Brahman. A the 
MuTJtfaka Upanifad, 2.2.1 0 and II has it: 
In the transcendent golden sheath is Brahman 
without taint, without parts. Pure it is, light 
of lights. That is what the knowers of the 
Atman know. 
There the sun shines not, nor the moon, nor the 
stars, these lightnings shine not. So whence 
could this fire be? Everything shines only after 
that shining light. His shining lightens this 
whole universe. 
Commenting on the line "everything jhincs only after that shining light", 
§ankara writes, "In the light of that (Alman) alone everything that is not -
Atman shines as it does not have power to shine by itself (tasyaiva bhasa 
sarvam anyad anatma-jatam prakiisyate, na tu tasya svatah prakasana-
siimarthyam l." · 
On lhe contrary the Kantian doctrine seems to say that things thai appear to 
us are dark, and we can see only darkly based on our limited capacity for 
experience and the limited power of our reason; and as for lhe things-in-
themselves, there is no hint of any light of their own reaching us. In some sense 
this doctrine seems to be the very obverse of the Vedanta. 
It wa Paul Deussen the great German cholar of the Vedanta and a friend of 
Nietzsche who wrote and worked on the assumption of a similarity between 
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Parmenides, Kant and Sankara. Deusscn argued that Kant's teaching that "the 
world reveals to us appearances ,...only and not the being of things-in-
themselves' 7 is exactly the same as Sankara's. Deussen set a pattern which is 
still very much in vogue. 
Nietzsche a close friend of Deussen, after reading the Iauer's Das System 
des Vedanta, wrote in a letter to him that having read the book page for page he 
found that his po ilion was "Ye where your book says No. ' 8 Nietzsche read 
some works of the Vedanta at first hand, and he rejected that system for the 
same reason he rejected Kant. He writes: 
At bottom Kant wanted to prove tl1at starting from the subject the subject 
could not be proved - nor cou ld the object; the possibility of a merely 
apparent existence (Schei nexistenz) of the subject, ' the soul ' in other 
words, may not always have remained strange to him - that thought as 
Vedanta philosophy existed once before on thi earth and exercised 
tremendous power. 9 
The mistake of treating the Vedanta in terms of Appearance-Reality will 
become clear as we probe ilie idea of the self-shining of Brahman. 
The locus classicus of the idea is in Brhadarm;yaka 4.3.1-6. Here different 
sources of light by which we can see things and are able to move about are 
discussed, the sun, the moon, fire and speech itself. The question finally is 
raised as to what happens in a condition in which all these various sources of 
light are no longer ava ilable. 'When the sun has set, Yajnavalkya and the 
m on has set and fire ha gone out and speech has become silent what light 
docs a person here have?" ' Alman indeed is the light said he, for Alman as 
light one its, m ves around , goes about one's work and returns". 
Among the most typical words for light are and bhii!z. In one place 
these two are used together, svena bhasl'i, svena (By his own sh ining, 
by his own li&,ht), 4.3 .9. The stem bltii is cognate with Greek 
pita. Bha i of particular importance because of what we can learn from ilie 
Greek paraiiel and also because it is picked out for analysis in the MaitrT 
UpanifOd 6. 7. "Bhii means that he illumines these worlds", (bha iti bllasay-
atimiin) 
Heidegger discusses words from the Greek stem pita. We are struck by the 
great similarity. To quote a lengthy passage from Heidegger: 
The Greek expression mcx 1, VOlt r v o v , to which ilie term 'phenomenon' goes 
back, is derived from the word cpcx Cv E:a{}aL. , which signifies "to show 
itself'. Thus <PCX.L.VOU E: \IOV means that which shows itself, the manifest 
jdas, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare) cpa Gve:CT-l:!a l. itself 
is a middle-voiced from which comes cpaC vw to bring to the light of day, to put 
in the light. q>aC vto comes from the stem cpa like cpw!) , the light, that 
which is bright, in other words, that wherein something can become manifest, 
visible in itself. Thus we must keep;, mind that the expression ' phenomenon' 
signifies that which show itself in it elf the manifest.IO 
In view of this the doctrine of Appearance (Erscheinung) as against Reality 
may have something t d with extending the concept of phenomenon in a new 
directi n. Heidegger points ut that 'phenomenon' has two significations, the 
first being 'that \ hich shows itsclr and the sec0nd 'that which sh ws itself a 
something which it is not, and therefore merely looking like so-and-so or 
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emblance . The first one is the primordial signification while lhe second one is 
nonethele s founded on it. But Heidegger states that neither of them has 
anything at all to d with is cal led 'an appearance' and till less ' a mere 
appearance . 
In the Vedanta too all this is true. Light etc.) has the primary 
and econdary . ignilications tl1at Heidegger's discus ion of Phenomenon' 
points out. There is also a seeming appearance, which i illustrated by the rope-
nake analogy. But there is no such thing as a mere appearance without a 
transcendent sub tratum. A mere appearance is a mere illusion and it has no 
status whatsoever. Mayii, which is indefinable (anirvacanTya) is itself a 
phenomenon in the proper sense, a manifestation of the Ultimately Real. Even 
in the condition of maya (which is the totality of all conditions) there is the 
possib.ility of transcendental certainty as to the Eternal. The work of 
philosophy is to how the way to that certainty. It only inculcate that certainty 
through exegesis of Being aimed at the removal of the veiling ig9orance 
(avidya) which obscures the unity of one's own being with Brahman. Sankara 
writes about the di cipl.ine of this philosophy (technically siistra) "It 
propounds Brahman as not being an object but as being the universal Self and 
thereby removes the distinction between the known, the knower and 
knowledge" (Commentary on Vedanta Sutras, 1. I .4 ). Clearly, transcendental 
certa inty is not outside the condition called maya but within it. For outside 
mayii there is no need for philosophy, not even for certainty. It will be gnosis 
itself. 
Now, is this transcendental certainty dogmatism? Neitzsche would describe 
it as such. He writes: 
It seems that all great things lirsl' have to be tride U1e earth in monstrous and 
frightening masks (Fratzen) in order to inscribe themselves in the hearts of 
humanity with eternal demands: dogmatic philosophy was such a mask; for 
example the Vedanta doctrine in Asia and Platonism in Europe. '' 
Now that we have come to Nietzsche and his reaction to the Vedanta, it is 
time to throw away all the books and speak a few words in aphorisms, and then 
conclude. I am not able to speak for Platonism and so will confine myself to the 
Vedanta. But it would seem that what is applicable to the one is in large 
measure applicable to the other as well. 
If the Vedanta seems to be dogmatic it i for reason diametrically opposed 
to those on which dogmatism is usually founded. 
Even if U1e Vedanta were dogmatic it is so only for matters of a transcendent 
nature . If one has to be dogmatic at all it is perhap better to be dogmatic for 
such matters than for worldly thing based on empirical assumptions or 
dialectical laws of history and the like. 
The transcendent wiiliout the immanent is benign. But the immanent wiiliout the transcendent is only harmless at best; without lhe transcendent the immanent 
has no bite. 
When an immanentist doctrine assumes the character of transcendental 
certainty it has to trade knowledge for power. Then it becomes a tiger with 
which it is hard to live and dangerous to lie down. 
The transcendent i the only defense against the tyrannic of history and 
against history itself which i probably the greatest of all tyrannies, because it 
is the most transcendental form that immanentist reason arrogates to itself. 
The transcendent is the only true friend of the friendless . It alone keeps our 
secrets. Because of it what can never be spoken is also spoken. 
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Atheism, whatever it is, is a friend of the immanent gods. The transcendent 
is never a god. 
There are three forms or temporal immanentism· past (history), present 
(social reality), futu.re (technology). Those who are consumed by any of these 
are usually hostile to the Eternal while those who are consumed by the Eternal 
are always benevolently disposed to U1e three realms. 
Total concentration on the immanent makes the immanent monstrous and 
diabolical. It generates the tyranny of immediacy, which is the impatience with 
the need to be patient, with delay of fulfilment in fact fru stration of 
transcendence itself. Do not call it freedom. 
If we have to choose between transcendental certainty and immanental 
uncertainty on the one hand and transcendental uncertainty and immanent 
certainty on the other it is far better to choose the former. 
Immanental uncertainty that is, uncertainty about what is beforehand, is one 
of the highest gifts of the Eternal, if it already cohabits with transcendental 
certainty. There is no room for dogmatism here. 
Transcendental certainty is to the Knowledge of the Good what the 
Categorical Imperative is to the knowledge of what ought to be done. Both are 
above dogmatism, Besides, beca·use of transcendental certainty the Categorical 
Imperative wiLJ be able to bring forU1 noble deeds. This age especially cries for 
noble deeds. 
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